What Colleges Can Learn from the Detroit Almost-Bombing

Dear Colleagues,

A short blog thought for you in this holiday interstice about the attempted terrorist bombing over Detroit on Christmas, and its implications for threat assessment in higher education. More reports come out each day about this incident, but a central question that everyone is asking is why was this bomber not identified sooner, and why didn't some responsible agency have a closer eye on him?

There are only a few possible answers, all of which have implications for colleges and universities:

1. Responsible agencies did have intel on Abdulmutallab, but did not accurately classify the level of risk the intel indicated. This is a rather unlikely conclusion, though we make sport of constant charges of government incompetence. The risk assessment tools in use by intelligence agencies are sound, and are implemented by some of the world's foremost threat experts. Nothing suggests a misclassification so far. The implications for colleges and universities lie in using informal risk classification mechanisms, "feel-based" approaches, inconsistent measures (we often get this from over-reliance on mental health assessments by different assessors, or using different inventories/scales) or risk rubrics that are not meant to be used for the kinds of risk being assessed.

2. There were reports raising red flags about Abdulmutallab, but they did not provide sufficient intel to be actionable -- to peg him high enough on the risk scale for "no-fly" or any other kind of action/intervention. In higher education, this is a real fear, as well. Someone within our communities is a real and present danger, and we don't know it. We have bits and pieces, but nothing to indicate the impending crisis with any accuracy or forewarning. This reminds us of the need to continue to build and empower cultures of reporting, where the right decisionmakers know what the people on the frontlines know. A culture of reporting exists when all members of the community recognize when they come into possession of key pieces of intel, know who to pass the intel along to, and do so in real time and with accuracy.

3. Nigeria knew, but America or the intelligence agencies of other countries did not. This is the silo effect where communication either does not flow, or is impeded. This is one of the main challenges for any organization, whether it is an intelligence agency, college or university. Some level of communication barrier is inevitable. Perhaps it is reasonable to argue that a report in Nigeria by a father of a remotely radicalized son is not something that should be known immediately by intelligence agencies around the world. There must be hundreds of thousands of such young men, and concerned parents. Yet, when the father of Cho's suitemate learned that Cho had threatened suicide, he reported it immediately, and Virginia Tech's police department took action immediately. To me, it speaks to the value of intel that can come from outside our jurisdictions, campuses, and communities that can bear directly upon our communities. Perfect communication is impossible, but priority communication can help to ensure the flow of critical intel, even if lesser intel may not always get through.

4. Finally, it may be that the red flags raised about Abdulmutallab were sufficient for a watch list or or risk status elevation, but there was insufficient man or womanpower to investigate and make that critical judgment call. This is a persistent detriment in the intelligence world, where no action is taken on actionable intelligence either because the agency has insufficient resources, there is just too high a volume of reports to investigate all of them adequately, or there is a language or other barrier to effective follow-up. It is also a potential hazard for colleges and universities that are experiencing a high volume of reports of concerning behaviors, but do not have the resources to adequately follow-up and investigate. While we may feel this is inexcusable, it happens on many college campuses, and the best band aid is an effective triage system where all reports are follow-up, but some more quickly and with more intensity than others. This brings us back to have a risk rubric we can trust, because we can rely on it for initial triage and ultimately overall threat, too, once we have collected more intel and engaged a preliminary investigation.

Those are my thoughts for now. Happy New Year, and for those of you who, like me, are headed back onto an airplane soon, the vigilance and action of those who engaged Abdulmutallab on flight 253 may have made all the difference. Keep your eyes open, and be willing to intervene when something smells wrong, or like smoke.

Regards,

Brett Sokolow